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The Politics of Knowledge
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting,
Shareholder Voice, and. Human Rights
AARON A. DHIR*
This article considers the relationship between social disclosure and corporate account-
ability in Canada. It focuses on the potential benefits social disclosure can provide in terms
of the overall human rights project. I explore this issue with reference to the broader theo-
retical frameworks of new governance and reflexive law. White I ground my analysis in these
analytical approaches. I distance myself slightly from particular arguments in the literature
to date: specifically, the argument that the disclosure process will result in self-correcting
behaviour on the part of corporate decision makers. Rather, I argue that the value of social
disclosure may lie more in its ability to empower socially conscious shareholders who will
be equipped with information that can be used to engage corporate management in dialogue
and influence corporate operations. I further contend that a movement towards enhanced
social disclosure should be viewed as the corollary of recent developments in Canadian
corporate law involving directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations.
Cet article r~flchit 6 La relation entre [a divulgation sociale et l'obligation corporative de
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Ia divulgation sociale sur le plan du projet global des droits humains. Jexplore cette ques-
tion en r6f6rence au cadre th6orique plus g6n6ral de la nouvelle gouvernance et du droit
r6flexif. Certes, je fonde mon analyse sur ces trois d6marches analytiques, mais je prends
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l[g~rement mes distances vis-6-vis d'arguments precis, trouv6s dans [a documentation
produite jusqu'ici : en particulier, l'argument se!on !equel le processus de divulgation
entrainera une modification auto-correctrice du comportement de La part des d6cideurs
corporatifs. Plut6t, j'argue que [a vateur de la divulgation sociate pourrait bien se trouver
davantage dans sa capacit6 de donner !e pouvoir aux actionnaires citoyens, qui seront munis
d'information pouvant servir 6 pousser les dirigeants corporatifs A.engager le dialogue et
influencer le fonctionnement corporatif. En outre, je soutiens qu'une progression vers une
meilleure divulgation sociate devrait itre percue comme le corotlaire des derniers d6ve-
Loppements en mati~re de droit corporatif canadien concernant les obligations fiduciaires
des administrateurs et des cadres.
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[Cjorporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead ... When ... law
ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the entire body of law that had been
built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have
nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes-towering skyscrapers of
rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.
There is still a good bit of work to be done to persuade someone to give a decent
burial to the shivering skeletons. 1
OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST THREE YEARS, two important-and seem-
ingly unrelated-public policy processes concluded in Canada. First, the In-
vestment Dealers Association of Canada sponsored a comprehensive review of
Canadian securities regulation with a view towards modernizing the legislative
framework and improving the effectiveness of our capital markets. The Final
Report of the "Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada" was
1. Bayless Manning, "The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker" (1962)
72 Yale L.J. 223 at 245, n. 37.
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released in October 2006 (Task Force Report).2 The sixty-five recommenda-
tions set forth are the product of thirty research papers prepared by interna-
tional and Canadian academics and practitioners, oral and written submissions,
and a series of eight stakeholder consultations. Second, the federal government
-under the leadership of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade-sponsored a process designed to address issues of corporate social re-
sponsibility vis-A-vis the developing world operations of the mining, oil, and gas
sectors. The final Advisory Group Report arising from the "National Roundtables
on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Industry in
Developing Countries" (Advisory Group Report) was released in March 2007.'
2. Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps Up: Final Report,
vol. 1 (Toronto: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006), online:
<http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/Volumel-en.pdf> [Task Force, Final Report]. For a discussion of
the Task Force's recommendations from the perspective of retail investors, see Paul Halpern
& Poonam Puri, "Reflections on the Recommendations of the Task Force to Modernize
Securities Legislation in Canada: A Retail Investor Perspective" (2008) 46 Can. Bus. L.J. 199.
3. Task Force, Final Report, ibid. at 21; Report of the Task Force to Modernize Securities
Legislation in Canada: Written Submissions and Presentations, vol. 7 (Toronto: Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006), online: <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/
Volume7_en.pdf>.
4. One of these consultations was a roundtable tided "Critical Issues in Enforcement," held at the
University of Toronto's Capital Markets Institute (3 February 2006), which I participated in.
5. National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive
Industry in Developing Countries, Advisory Group Report (March 2007), online: <http://
www.mining.ca/www/medialib/MACDocumentslPublications/CSRENG.pdf> [National
Roundtables, Advisory Group Report]. In June 2005, the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) adopted a report of its Parliamentary Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International Development, which was then submitted to Parliament.
The SCFAIT Report was groundbreaking, calling for the Canadian government to, inter alia,
enhance incentives to foster corporate compliance with international human rights norms,
and to improve and create new tools for monitoring corporate operations in the developing
world. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Fourteenth Report, 38th Parl. 1st Sess. (2005), online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/
Content/HOC/committee/381/faae/reports/rp 1961949/FAAERptl4-e.htm>. The
g6vernment tabled a response in October 2005 that neglected to adopt many of the SCFAIT
Report's recommendations. It did, however, agree to organize the roundtable process. See
Government of Canada, Government Response to the Fourteenth Report of the Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Mining in Developing Countries- Corporate Social
Responsibility (October 2005), online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/
38 1/faae/govresponse/rp203O362/faae-rpt1 4 gvtrsp-e.htm>. The stated purpose of the
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The twenty-seven recommendations set forth are the product of 156 oral and
104 written submissions,' and a series of multi-stakeholder consultations held
in four Canadian cities.7
At first instance, the two processes may appear as two ships passing in the
night---and under conditions of poor visibility. Surely an initiative designed to
enhance the efficiency of Canadian capital markets and another to address the
harmful practices of Canadian extractive companies would have incongruous
aims. And yet, upon deeper consideration, the possibility of convergence-of a
collision at sea-becomes apparent. The particular point of intersection that is
of interest in this paper is the concept of mandatory social disclosure.9 The crux
of this concept is that publicly traded corporations must report to investors not
only on the fact of revenue generation, but also on the method by which reve-
nues are generated."0 For example, in addition to traditional financial informa-
tion, a company would report on its patterns of legal compliance and its policies,
practices, and business impacts as they relate to issues such as the environment,
labour, and human rights.
Although the recommendations of the Task Force Report did not make
explicit mention of social disclosure, it is both directly and indirectly -referenced
in some of the underlying research studies that the Task Force commissioned,
roundtables was "to examine measures that could be taken to position Canadian extractive
sector companies operating in developing countries to meet or exceed leading international
Corporate Social Responsibility ... standards and best practices." See "The National
Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility," online: Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Canada <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current-discussions/csr-roundtables-
en.aspx>.
6. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, ibid. at i.
7. I participated as an invited expert at the roundtable consultation held in Toronto (3
February 2006).
8. This metaphor was recently used by Philip Alston in discussing the relationship between the
Millennium Development Goals and international human rights. See Philip Alston, "Ships
Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate
Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals" (2005) 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 755.
9. Other similar terminology in the literature includes non-financial disclosure, extra-financial
reporting, triple bottom line reporting, corporate social transparency, and sustainability
reporting.
10. Cynthia Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency" (1999) 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 at 1201 [Williams, "The Securities and
Exchange Commission"].
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including those of Professor Sarra, and Professors Condon and Puri. In explor-
ing the possibility of an integrated market disclosure document," Janis Sarra
suggests that it "may also be timely to require disclosure ... in respect of cor-
porate social and environmental responsibility measures, as part of the corpo-
rate governance disclosures."12 Mary Condon and Poonam Puri further note
that. "investors, especially retail investors ... are motivated to seek investments
where good corporate governance and a commitment to social responsibility are
a factor."13
Meanwhile, the Advisory Group Report took a strong step further with two
final recommendations that engage social disclosure. Recommendation #3 asks
the federal government to adopt the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)1" as a
disclosure framework and to mandate that the extractive sector be progressively
required to report using this framework or its equivalent." Further, recommen-
dation #14 asks the federal government to work with the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants (CICA), provincial regulators, and the Canadian Secu-
rities Administrators (CSA) to clarify that environmental, social, and govern-
ance-related information is to be considered "material" in respect of the public
markets disclosure process.16
11. That is, "[a] sort of 'living' electronic [disclosure document] that investors can access at any
point in the life cycle of [an] issuer." Janis Sarra, "Modernizing Disclosure in Canadian
Securities' Law: An Assessment of Recent Developments in Canada and Selected Jurisdictions"
(Paper Commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 29
May 2006) at 11, online: <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docsV2(IA)%2OSarra.pdf>.
12. Ibid.
13. Mary Condon & Poonam Pur, "The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory
Enforcement" (Paper commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada, 28 June 2006) at 19, online: <http://www.tfmsl.ca/docsV6(1)%2OCondonPuri.pdf_>.
14. The Global Reporting Initiative is a not-for-profit, multi-stakeholder initiative that provides
guidance on sustainability reporting. See "About GRI," online: <http://www.globalreporting.
org/AboutGRI/>.
15. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, supra note 5 at v. Among other accompanying
recommendations, it suggests that the federal government "[clollaborate with securities
regulators and exchanges on adopting GRI reporting for the overseas operations of Canadian
extractive-sector companies as a requirement for listing" (at vi).
16. Ibid. at xi. Frustratingly, the government of Canada has not yet provided a response to the
Advisory Group Report. This lack of action recently led SCFAIT to recommend to the
House of Commons that "the government provide its response in a reasonable time." See
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
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In the nearly fifty years since Bayless Manning declared the death of the
study and development of corporation law,17 the corporation as a site of inquiry
has undoubtedly been resurrected. Not all of the catalysts behind this change
have been positive. The Task Force Report and the Advisory Group Report
come at a time when the overseas operations of Canadian corporations are be-
ing increasingly impugned by civil society organizations,18 United Nations treaty
bodies,19 parliamentarians," and scholars21 for their severe human rights-related
Sixth Report, 39th Parl. 2d Sess., No. 34 (3 June 2008), online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/
CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=242142>. The Government has, however, announced its
support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a multi-stakeholder organization
which "supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and
full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining." See
Department of Finance Canada, "Canada's New Government Supports an International
Initiative to Improve Governance in Resource-Rich Countries" (February 2007), online:
<http://www.fin.gc.calnews07/07-012e.html>; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
"EITI Summary" (September 2007), online: <http://www.eitransparency.org/eiti/summary>.
17. Manning, supra note 1.
18. See e.g. Rights Action, "Investing in Conflict: Public Money, Private Gain -. Goldcorp in the
Americas" (2008), online: <http://www.rightsaction.org/Reports/research.pdf> [Rights Action,
"Investing in Conflict"]; CorpWatch, "Barrick's Dirty Secrets: Communities Worldwide
Respond to Gold Mining's Impacts" (May 2007), online: <http://s3.amazonaws.com/
corpwatch.org/dovnloads/Barrick-final-sml.pdf>; Canadian Network on Corporate
Accountability, "Dirty Business, Dirty Practices: How the Federal Government Supports
Canadian Mining, Oil and Gas Companies Abroad" (May 2007), online: <http://www.
halifaxinitiative.org/dirtypractices/DirtyPractices.pdf>; MiningWatch Canada, "Victim or
Villain? Canadian Mining Investment in South-east Ecuador Exacerbates Divisions, Conflicts"
(July 2007), online: <http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/EcuadorAnalysis-final.pdf>; and
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, "Mining for Justice: The Struggle
of Honduran Civil Society for Responsible Mining" (September 2007), online: <http:// www.
devp.org/devpme/eng/advocacy/doc/Hondurasreport.pdf> [CCODP, "Mining for Justice"].
19. In 2007, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
reviewed Canada's compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. See United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee
on Elimination of Racial Discrimination - Canada, UN CERD, 17th Sess., UN Doc. CERD/
C/CAN/CO/18 (25 May 2007) at para. 17, online: Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bl dc7b4043cl 256a450044f331/
3278670d0ea97704c I 25730600385a7a/$FILE/GO742169.pdf>. The committee writes:
The Committee notes with concern the reports of adverse effects of economic activities con-
nected with the exploitation of natural resources in countries outside Canada by transna-
tional corporations registered in Canada on the right to land, health, living environment and
DHIR. THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION 53
impacts. Allegations of Canadian corporate complicity in human rights-related
violations and unethical practices have run the gamut from environmental and
ecological degradation to resource exploitation; the use of security operatives
that have been linked to killings; forced evictions, land expropriation, and the
displacement of civilian populations; threatening indigenous spiritual, histori-
cal, and burial sites; campaigns to silence opposition; poor working conditions;
the way of life of indigenous peoples living in these regions.... [T]he Committee encourages
the State party to take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to prevent acts of
transnational corporations registered in Canada which negatively impact on the enjoyment
of rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside Canada. In particular, the Committee
recommends that the State party explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered
in Canada accountable. The Committee requests the State parry to include in its next peri-
odic report information on the effects of activities of transnational corporations registered in
Canada on indigenous peoples abroad and on any measures taken in this regard.
20. In 2007, Canadian and British members of Parliament conducted a fact-finding mission on
mining operations in Honduras, meeting with civil society representatives, local community
members, and Honduran government officials. The parliamentarians noted, inter alia, the
lack of legal infrastructure and the power imbalance that "allows mining companies to define
the terms of engagement with the government of Honduras, with- local communities and
with the environment." They further wrote as follows: "[w]e call on all home countries of
mining, oil and gas corporations operating in the countries of the Global South, in particular
on Canada, to enact standards of corporate social responsibility in overseas operations." See
Open Letter of Parliamentarians Keith Hill, Stephen Pound & Alexa McDonough (13
September 2007) in CCODP, "Mining for Justice," supra note 18 at 29-30.
21. See e.g. Craig Scott & Robert Wai, "Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct
through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational
'Private' Litigation" in C. Joerges, P. Sand & G. Teubner, eds., Transnational Governance
and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 287 at 297-303 (discussing the
operations of former Quebec-based mining company Cambior in Guyana-in particular, a
cyanide spill into a Guyanese river. The paper analyzes the subsequent litigation and argues
that the result "should not obscure the potential of human rights discourse to inform conflict-
of-laws queries as to the adequacy of foreign courts" at 297); Shin Imai, Ladan Mehranvar &
Jennifer Sander, "Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala" (2007) 6
Indigenous L.J. 101 [Imai, Mehranvar & Sander, "Breaching Indigenous Law"] (exploring
the dispute between Glamis Gold/GoldCorp and indigenous communities in Guatemala);
Sara L. Seck, "Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global
Mining" (2008) 11 Yale Human Rts. & Dev. L.J. 177 at 205 (noting alleged Canadian
corporate complicity in human rights violations abroad and arguing that "there is an emerging
obligation for home states to regulate and adjudicate transnational mining corporations");
and Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin & Penelope Simons, "Deconstructing Engagement:
Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones - Implications For H'uman Rights and Canadian
Public Policy" (January 2003) at 3-4, online: <www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/
DeconstructingEngagement.pdf>.
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and health and safety violations.22 These concerns have focused primarily on
the Canadian extractive industry. Canada has listed on its stock exchanges more
mining firms than any other state,23 and, globally, these exchanges represent "the
world's largest source of equity capital for mining exploration and production. '"26
To date, the concept of social disclosure has received scant consideration
in Canadian academic legal literature.2' Recommendation #14 of the Advisory
Group Report, which proposes that the federal government "support the devel-
opment and dissemination of research and further guidance on the materiality
of environmental, social and governance issues," 2' arguably reflects and is in-
tended to redress this shortfall. The aim of this article is to contribute to the
evolving discourse and to inform current and future policy reform initiatives.27
22. See generally notes 18-20 above.
23. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, supra note 5 at 3 [citation omitted].
24. Ibid. at 3 [citation omitted]. My analysis in this paper focuses on publicly traded
corporations that issue securities for public distribution and are the subject of securities
regulation. These corporations are more likely to be implicated in problematic overseas
conduct.
25. Exceptions include David J. Doorey, "Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour
Practiccs through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J.
353 [Doorey, "Who Made That?"]; Benjamin J. Richardson, "Financing Environmental
Change: A New Role for Canadian Environmental Law" (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 145 at 195-
98; Allan C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a Democratic
Society (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 299-304; Ian Lee, "Corporate Law, Profit
Maximization and the 'Responsible' Shareholder"' (2005) 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31 at 65-
71 [Lee, "Corporate Law"]; and J. Anthony VanDuzer, The Law of Partnerships and
Corporations, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 467-69.
26. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, supra note 5 at xi.
27. This includes policy reform through the following initiatives. First, as mentioned above, the
Canadian government has not yet given its response to the Advisory Group's National
Roundtables Report. Second, in February 2008, the "Expert Panel on Securities Regulation"
was appointed by the federal finance minister to provide "advice and recommendations to
the federal Minister of Finance, and the provincial and territorial ministers responsible for
securities regulation" on the best way forward to improve securities regulation in Canada. See
"About Us," online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/
about-us/index.php>. Third, under s. 143.12(1) of Ontario's Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
S.5, the Ontario government is required by 31 May 2007 to designate an advisory
committee to review current legislation, regulations, and rules pertaining to provincial
securities law. Presumably, the work of this panel will begin in due course. The last advisory
committee report was released in 2003. See Five Year Review Committee, Final Report:
Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) (Toronto: Publications Ontario, 2003), online:
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In previous articles, I analyzed the relationship between corporations and human
rights through the lens of corporate law and governance.28 Those works revisit
aspects of the underlying DNA and conceptual. architecture of the law, culture,
and practice that shape corporate activity; in doing so, they explore how tradi-
tional corporate law tools and doctrine can raise the level of human rights dis-
course and awareness within the corporate structure, and influence business
operations. Building upon this, the present article is one of two that explores
the relationship between social disclosure and corporate accountability in Can-
ada at both the doctrinal and conceptual levels.
Elsewhere, I argue that existing continuous disclosure obligations in Cana-
dian securities law, which require public companies to provide periodic and
timely disclosure'to investors, provide a sufficient legal basis to compel corpora-
tions to report the types of material social information listed above. 9 Various
weaknesses, however, limit the potential of existing securities provisions and
arguably facilitate corporate opacity. The article offers recommendations to
enhance the social disclosure landscape. Its argument, based on risk and inves-
tor value, is that, with the disclosure of material social information, sharehold-
ers are in a better position to assess pecuniary risks and to allocate capital to firms
that are best suited to mitigate these risks.
The present article moves beyond the sphere of investor protection to ex-
plore the issues at a more conceptual level. I address the potential benefits of
social disclosure within the overall human rights project. In the next part, I
Ontario Ministry of Finance <http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/english/publications/2003/
5yrsecuritiesreview.pdf>.
28. See Aaron A. Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a
Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability" (2006) 43 Am.
Bus. L.J. 365 at 369-74 [Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks"]; Aaron A. Dhir,
"Of Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human Rights: Unpacking the Noranda-Minmetals
Conundrum" (2006) 22 B.F.L.R. 77 at 92-94 [Dhir, "Of Takeovers, Foreign Investment
and Human Rights"].
29. Aaron A. Dhir, "Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through
Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law" 47 Can. Bus. L.J. [forthcoming in
2009] [Dhir, "Shadows and Light"]. In this complementary article, I review the extent to
which Canadian companies have been reporting social information and canvass the degree to
which such disclosure is actually required under securities law. I focus my analysis of
continuous disclosure obligations on three of the key components of periodic disclosure:
quarterly and annual financial statements, the management discussion and analysis, and,
most importantly, the annual information form.
I
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explore the topic of social disclosure with reference to the broader theoretical
frameworks of new governance and reflexive law. Although grounding the analy-
sis in these approaches, I distance myself slightly from the argument in the lit-
erature, to date, that the disclosure process will result in self-correcting behaviour
modification on the part of corporate decision makers. Rather, in the second part,
I argue that the value of social disclosure may lie more in its ability to empower
socially conscious shareholders, who will be equipped with information that can
be used to engage corporate management in dialogue and influence corporate
operations. The third part contends that a movement towards enhanced social
disclosure should be viewed as the corollary of recent developments in Canadian
corporate law involving directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations. In the final
part, I offer some concluding remarks.
I. NEW GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVE LAW, AND SOCIAL
DISCLOSURE
The concept of corporate reporting of social information has moved on and off
the public radar (and has received both warm and hostile reactions) in recent
times, and has been a matter of continuous inquiry since the mid 1990s." As
discussed above, the central idea is that corporations should provide investors
with information that goes beyond merereports of revenue generation in order
30. Rob Gray, "Thirty Years of Social Accounting, Reporting and Auditing: What (if anything)
Have We Learnt?" (2001) 10 Bus. Ethics: A European Rev. 9 at 9. The issue of required social
disclosure is an aspect of the broader debate surrounding required disclosure by public
corporations in general. See Lee, "Corporate Law," supra note 25 at 66. For a sample of recent
discussions regarding US corporate/securities law and the disclosure of social information,
see Perry E. Wallace, "Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are
Things Heating up in the Boardroom?" (2008) 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 293; David Monsma &
Timothy Olson, "Muddling through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure:
The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information" (2007)
26 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 137; Eric Engle, "What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights,
Shareholder Activism and SEC Reporting Requirements" (2006) 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 63;
Allison M. Snyder, "Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is Non-Financial
Disclosure the Answer?" (2007) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 565; Michael J. Viscuso, "Scrubbing
the Books Green: A Temporal Evaluation of Corporate Environmental Disclosure
Requirements" (2007) 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 879; and David Monsma &John Buckley, "Non-
Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental
Disclosure" (2004) 11 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 151.
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to account for the method of such generation.3 Professor Cynthia Williams,
one of the most prominent supporters of social information disclosure, articu-
lates its potential content as follows:
Expanded social disclosure would generally include information on the products a
company produces and the countries in which it does business; on the company's
law compliance structure; on its domestic labor practices; on its global labor practices
and supplier/vendor standards; and on its domestic and global environmental effects.
Other types of social disclosure could include information on corporate charitable
contributions, political contributions, or the effects of using a company's products
on consumer health and safety.
32
Beyond its content, the next question is what such social disclosure would
achieve. What are the potential benefits of social disclosure to the overall hu-
man rights project? Can it be argued that the disclosure of social information
will actually influence corporate operations in a manner that serves to partially
remedy the rights-violating repercussions of corporate conduct?
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In present currents of legal thought, there has been a marked movement away
from traditional regulatory models to a focus on issues of governance.33 In rec-
ognition of constantly shifting political and socio-economic conditions, 6 and
the constraints of conventional legal approaches," "new governance "" is a re-
31. Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission," supra note 10 at 1201.
32. Ibid. at 1201-03. For more on the elements of social reporting, see David Hess, "Social
Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness" (1999) 25 J.
Corp. L. 41 at 64 [Hess, "Social Reporting"]; David Hess, "Regulating Corporate Social
Performance: A New Look at Corporate Social Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting"
(2001) 11 Bus. Ethics Q. 307 at 318 (setting out possible items of relevance to various
stakeholder groups).
33. Orly Lobel, "The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 at 343 [Lobel, "The Renew
Deal"].
34. Ibid. at 356-57.
35. Ibid. at 361. See also Lric W. Orts, "A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation"
(1995) 5 Bus. Ethics Q.779 at 780 ("[t]hinking about law only from a legal perspective
inevitably truncates analysis, confining it to a narrow perspective of the legal system and its
institutions").
36. See e.g.. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, "Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds" (2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015; Lester M. Salamon, ed., The Tools of
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constructive project that seeks, in part, to transcend traditional punitive and de-
terrence-based measures 7 in favour of generating norms and enhancing "internal
self-regulatory capacities."" Its models cannot be derived from any particular
strand of socio-legal theory, but represent a confluence of various approaches
including responsive regulation, democratic experimentalism, collaborative gov-
ernance, reflexive law,39 post-regulatory law, and regulatory pluralism."0
Conceptions of reflexive law, particularly those developed by Gunther Teub-
ner (discussed below)," can figure prominently in the new governance frame-
Government: A Guide to the New Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, "A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform" (2003) 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 183 (regarding new models of governance in the American public school
system); and Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, "A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism" (1998) 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 at 345-56.
37. David Hess, "Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of
Achieving Stakeholder Accountability through Transparency" (2007) 17 Bus. Ethics Q. 453
at 453 [Hess, "New Governance Regulation"].
38. Lobel, "The Renew Deal," supra note 33 at 365. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, "'New
Governance' In Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous
Lumping" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471 at 473. Karkkainen explains that:
This scholarship endeavors simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize, and advo-
cate a seismic reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the tools employed
in policy implementation. The valence of this reorientation ... is generally away from the famil-
iar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new
model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance.
For a recent, thought-provoking application of new governance ideas in the context of
Canadian securities law, see Cristie L. Ford, "New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation" (2008) 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 (positing principles-based securities
regulation as a form of new governance, using reform initiatives in British Columbia as a
case study). For a discussion of the corporate social responsibility movement as an element
of the new governance project, see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, "Engage, Embed,
and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement"
(2005) 31 J. Corp. L. 1 at 31-36 [Conley & Williams, "Engage, Embed, and Embellish"].
39. Hess, "New Governance Regulation," supra note 37 at 454.
40. Lobel, "The Renew Deal," supra note 33 at 346 [citations omitted]. This, of course, is not to
suggest that these approaches are uniform or that there is no debate amongst them. As noted
by Karkkainen, "there are not only disagreements but often important incompatibilities ...
sometimes on questions of fundamental importance, within a family of scholars whose work
is nonetheless seen from a more distant perspective as broadly related." Karkkainen, supra
note 38 at 480.
41. See e.g. Gunther Teubner, "Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg"
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work. There is not necessarily a symbiotic relationship between new governance
literature and Teubnerian notions of reflexivity. As argued by Bradley Kark-
kainen, Teubner's work is not used or even accepted by many new governance
scholars; however, Karkkainen acknowledges that some new governance scholars
rely on Teubner's writing to develop their analyses and advocate reflexivity-
based answers similar to those proposed by Teubner." Further, Orley Lobel
convincingly demonstrates "strikingly similar patterns of explanation" between
democratic experimentalism and reflexivity, and argues that Teubner himself
clearly connects his research to the former. 3 As such, I will draw from elements
of both new governance and reflexive law.
David Doorey notes that Teubner, among other important scholars, "argues
that a theory of 'global legal pluralism' is required to explain new forms of emerg-
ing 'global law,"' and that these forms "will grow mainly from the social peripher-
ies, not from the political centres of nation-states and international institutions.
Under this global regulatory model, the decentred state plays "an indirect role
in the governance of complex social and economic matters, a role as facilitator
and motivator of the norm-producing potential of non-state actors."" It follows
that, under this model, the role of the state is no longer regarded as the primary
analytical fulcrum, but rather as one amongst many different-and essential-
roles to be considered (e.g., those of civil society organizations, shareholders,
end purchasers, and organized labour)."
The reflexive approach endeavours to promote an institutional culture that
is mindful, conscious, and self-scrutinizing in terms of the social consequences of
the institution's practices. 7 With respect to corporations in particular, reflexive
law and the new governance paradigm are less preoccupied with "directly regu-
(1984) 18 Law & Soc'y Rev. 291; Gunther Teubner, "Regulatory Law: Chronicle of Death
Foretold" (1992) 1 Soc. &. Legal Stud. 451; and Gunther Teubner, "Substantive and
Reflexive Elements in Modern Law" (1983) 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 239.
42. Karkkainen, supra note 38 at 481, 483 [citations omitted].
43. Orly Lobel, "Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research" (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev.
498 at 504 [citation omitted].
44. Doorey, "Who Made That?" supra note 25 at 363, quoting Gunther Teubner, "'Global
Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Gunther Teubner, ed., Global Law
Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1997) 3 at 7.
45. Ibid at 366.
46. Ibid at 364.
47. Orts, supra note 35 at 780.
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lating corporate behavior-such, as through traditional command-and-control
models"-and seek instead to affect how companies are governed.48 Applying
this to social disclosure, rather than directly regulating corporate conduct that
has rights-violating implications, the state would regulate the corporate and
securities law landscape in which businesses operate with a view towards having
a normative influence on corporate operations. 9 Exposing corporate action to
the public should have a positive impact on how the firm is managed. The pos-
sibility of exposure will provide corporate managers with cause for reflection and
will serve to deter socially undesirable practices."0
B. SOCIAL DISCLOSURE AND NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
Moving beyond its intended objective under reflexive thinking, can social report-
ing exert a normative influence in the realm of corporate social responsibility?
Can it change the way the firm is managed?
Perhaps the most involved consideration of social disclosure in the Cana-
dian legal academy originates from Doorey. In a thoughtful and nuanced piece,
Doorey draws heavily on conceptions of reflexive law and the writing of Teub-
ner in particular. The focal point of his analysis is the unfair foreign labour
practices of certain multinational corporations. He observes that most of the
impugned firms operate under a "veil of secrecy," and are unwilling to disclose
the details of who makes their goods and the working conditions under which
they operate.51 In attempting to establish the connection between social disclo-
sure and firm management, Doorey provides a few examples, two of which are
especially relevant to the present discussion.
First, Doorey cites an anecdotal piece describing the surprise of former Mon-
santo C.E.O., Richard Mahoney, when he learned of the immensity of Mon-
santo's toxic emissions after it went through a mandated disclosure process under
US Toxics Release Inventory requirements. Mahoney then undertook to reduce
48. David Hess, "Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier
of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development" (2007) 2 Va. L. & Bus.
Rev. 221 at 232 [Hess; "Public Pensions"].
49. Doorey, "Who Made That?" supra note 25 at 366 [citation omitted].
50. Risa Vetri Ferman, "Environmental Disclosures and SEC Reporting Requirements" (1992)
17 Del. J. Corp. L. 483 at 508.
51. Doorey, "Who Made That?" supra note 25 at 355-56.
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the company's global air emissions by 90 per cent within four years.52 Second,
Professor Doorey considers the issue of executive compensation. He references
Edward lacobucci's argument that mandated reporting of compensation figures
and calculation processes may influence corporate directors and compensation
committees, which will be forced to defend compensation levels to interested
stakeholders and, therefore, be more measured in their approach.53
While these points are compelling, they arguably reflect a key limitation of
both reflexive and new governance approaches. Although a wide body of litera-
ture has developed and makes "ambitious claims," these claims and theories are
often speculative-their application to concrete situations is still in a state of
development."5
According to Professor Doorey, the Monsanto example reflects an educa-
tive process of managerial self-analysis" as well as an element of shaming.56 I
52. Ibid at 374, citing Mary Graham, "Regulation by Shaming" (2000) 285 Atlantic Monthly 36 at 38.
53. Ibid. at 375, citing Edward M. lacobucci, "The Effects of Disclosure on Executive
Compensation ' (1998) 48 U.T.L.J. 489 [lacobucci, "The Effects of Disclosure"]. Similar
arguments have been made by other scholars in the United States. See e.g. Sandeep Gopalan,
"Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay" (2007) 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 757 at 757 ("[t]his
article argues that increased disclosure of executives' compensation agreements will trigger
emotions like shame, guilt and embarrassment by corporations and executives. This in turn
has the potential to influence financial behavior and cause corporations to be more likely to
heed the concerns of the public and shareholders vis-a-vis executive pay").
54. Karkkainen, supra note 38 at 476-77 [citations omitted]. Karkkainen remarks (at 476):
Innovations occur here and there, discernible within a number of disparate policy domains
but dominant in few, and the outcomes of these scattered policy experiments remain am-
biguous and contested. Even the most successful experiments have yet to be replicated
widely, leaving them vulnerable to the skeptics' charge that their success depends upon fac-
tors unique to their own time, place, and fortuitous circumstances. Consequently, within any
given field of inquiry, New Governance approaches may appear to some to be aberrational,
idiosyncratic, or unproven.
David Trubek and Louise Trubek have also recently recognized similar limitations. See
David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, "New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry or Transformation" (2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539 at 543, 560
(" [w]e ... recognize that substantial further work needs to be done to clarify terminology,
secure empirical information, and develop a more sophisticated typology"; "[t]his process
will require careful delineation of variables and substantial-empirical work. ... [T] here is very
little hard data available on most of the cases we have identified").
55. Doorey, "Who Made That?" supra note 25 at 374.
56. Ibid at 374-75 ("[i]f disclosure of the information may impede the company's own goals-
perhaps by threatening the firm's public image in a manner that might influence sales or by
62 12009] 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
agree that the very process of assembling the necessary data can be educative;
however, I am less convinced of the effectiveness of shaming. As stated by Pro-
fessor Oshionebo, shaming through public disclosure of misbehaviour can, in
some cases, have a positive effect on corporate behaviour, but "[c]orporations
are not monolithic entities, they can exhibit varying behavioral images and con-
trol public relations. Thus, whether or not 'shaming' affects the behavior of a
corporation may depend on its character.""7 Further, although there may be ex-
amples of changes in the way the firm is managed, economist Philip Monaghan
cautions that "little evidence to date exists of social and sustainability reporting
providing an effective tool in making a real difference to corporate decisions,
practices and outcomes.""
With respect to the example of executive compensation, I am also hesitant.
lacobucci himself concedes that his claims are speculative, and he has not at-
tempted to substantiate them empirically. 9 Arguably, compensation disclosure
requirements have actually produced a result that is the opposite of what was
anticipated by reflexive approaches." Although the scholarship is still in its in-
increasing public demand for more direct forms of state intervention-then it may
encourage corporate leaders rn take a more personal interest in the targeted social practice")
[citation omitted].
57. Evaristus Oshionebo, "The U.N. Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational
Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities" (2007) 19 Fla. J. Int'l L. 1 at 18 [citations
omitted]. See also Alon Harel & Alon Klement, "The Economics of Shame: Why More
Shaming May Deter Less" at 2 (24 August 2005) [unpublished], online: <http:I/papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=789244> (arguing as follows: "[t]he effectiveness of
shaming penalties is inversely related to the rate of shaming in the society. The more people
are shamed, the less effective shaming penalties may become" [citations omitted]).
58. Philip Monaghan, "Does Reporting Work? The Effect of Regulation" (2003) 21
AccountAbility Q. at 4-5. See also Hess, "Public Pensions," supra note 48 at 234 ("[b]eyond
anecdotal evidence, sustainability reporting has yet to have any demonstrated impact on
corporate social performance"). The dearth of relevant empirical work partially reflects
difficulties with data availability and, in particular, adequate indicators. E-mail
correspondence with Dr. Irene Herremans, Haskayne School of Business, University of
Calgary (17 April 2008) [copy on file with author].
59. lacobucci, "The Effects of Disclosure," supra note 53 at 500, 502. lacobucci does reference
Xianming Zhou, Essays on Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives (Doctoral
Thesis, University of Toronto, 1997) at 489, n. 6. For Zhou's later work, see infra note 61.
60. See e.g. Jared D. Harris, "What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?" (2009) 85 J. Bus.
Ethics 147 at 153 (writing that "not only do such efforts address the wrong problem and are
therefore misguided, but increased disclosure is, paradoxically, unlikely to be a diminishing
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fancy, very recent studies have analyzed finance literature in light of sociological
thought on the relationship between satisfaction and remuneration relative to
peer groups. These studies concluded that "[i]ncreasing disclosure on CEO
compensation without restricting CEOs' influence on the pay setting process
could ... intensify the race for greater pay, which has contributed to the ob-
served rise in levels and dispersions of CEO compensation in recent years."61
Further, these findings appear to resonate with those of recent industrial and
organizational psychology studies on pay-level satisfaction." Consonant with
what has been termed the "keeping up with the Joneses" or "Lake Wobegon"
effect, executives do not want to be under-compensated relative to their peers,
and firms do not want to be seen as employing substandard executives.63 With
increased disclosure, both factors militate towards upward trends in compensa-
tion. These results appear to confirm the prior speculation of certain academics6
and consultants, 65 as well as the anecdotal observations of the latter group.
66
force on executive pay trends in any event and has the potential to backfire" [citation
omitted]).
61. James S. Ang, Gregory Leo Nagel &Jun Yang, "Is there a Social Circle Premium in CEO
Compensation?" (17 March 2008) at 7 [unpublished], online: <http://papers..ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id= 107280> ("[w]e predict and empirically confirm that ... greater
compensation disclosure intensifies social comparisons and increases the social circle premium"
at 1). But see Xianming Zhou & Peter L. Swan, "Does Executive Compensation Disclosure
Alter Pay at the Expense of Incentives?" (21 June 2006) at 29 [unpublished], online:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=910865> ("we identify a positive
impact of executive compensation disclosure on managerial incentives, but no impact on pay
levels as such").
62. See Michael M. Harris, Frederik Anseel & Filip Lievens, "Keeping up with the Joneses: A
Field Study of the Relationships among Upward, Lateral, and Downward Comparisons and
Pay Level Satisfaction" (2008) 93 J. Applied Psychology 665 at 666, 667, 669, 671 (finding
as follows: "[u]pward comparison will significantly predict pay level satisfaction" at 666;
"[w]hen people perceive that they are paid less than is the upward comparison group, they
will be dissatisfied with their pay level" at 667; and "highest pay level satisfaction will occur
when pay level is congruent with the upward comparison" at 667).
63. See e.g. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance: Should Regulators Focus on
the Substance of Compensation Arrangements, or is Process-Based Review Enough?" (1996)
9 Can. Investment Rev. 43; Scott Schaefer & Rachel M. Hayes, "CEO Pay and the Lake
Wobegon Effect" (February 2007) [unpublished], online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=966332>.
64. Jill E. Fisch, "Teaching Corporate Governance through Shareholder Litigation" (2000) 34
Ga. L. Rev. 745 at 762 (writing that "disclosure may have the perverse effect of increasing
compensation levels as corporate executives become increasingly aware of payments made to
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I very much hope that the arguments presented by Professor Doorey will
prove correct-that the process of information gathering as part of social disclo-
sure requirements will lead to managerial self-reflection and the accompanying
behavioural modification.f In light of the speculative nature of these arguments,
however,6" I pursue a slightly different and complementary approach, 9 which
focuses on the role of non-state actors: specifically, on empowering socially
conscious shareholders through the shareholder proposal mechanism.7" The fol-
lowing part will provide an overview of this mechanism and explore its relation-
their peers" [citations omitted]).
65. Anne Field, "New Challenges Shape Pay Levels" Treasury &'Risk (May 2008) 48 at 50
(quoting Russell Boyle, a consultant with the Zurich based executive search firm, Egon
Zhender International: "'[d]isclosure rules are, not in and of themselves, going to change the
actual level of compensation for CEOs or other executives"').
66. Hannah Clark, "SEC: Show us the Money" Forbes (26 July 2006), online: <http://www.
forbes.com/2006/07/26/leadership-salary-compensation-cx hc 0726secupdate.html> ("'[t]o
the extent that the SEC thought by disclosing high pay levels it would influence behavior, it
didn't seem to really have that impact' [quoting Mark Borges, a principal with Mercer
Human Resources Consulting]. ... As more data are disclosed, executives learn what their
colleagues are realy makng. And compensation consultants, who advise boards on executive
pay, can use the extra data to argue that CEOs should be making more money. In other
words, a rising tide lifts all yachts").
67. Doorey's most recent work may further buttress his arguments. See David J. Doorey, "Can
Factory List Disclosure Improve Labor Practices in the Apparel Industry? A Case Study of
Nike and Levi-Strauss" (2008) [unpublished], online: CLPE Research Paper Series 1 <http://
www.comparativeresearch.net/index.jsp>.
68. I do not mean to suggest that disclosure regarding executive compensation and disclosure
regarding social information are directly analogous. It is difficult to imagine corporate
executives wanting to "keep up with the Joneses" in terms of rights violations or
environmental destruction. My point is simply to illustrate the speculative nature of the
behaviour modification argument and the fact that the results of disclosure may not conform
to the values and social norms that we would hope for or anticipate.
69. Professor Doorey acknowledges not only the potential value of disclosure with respect to
self-reflection and behaviour modification, but also in terms of empowering "various
groups in society-including consumers, investors, workers, and social activists." In that
regard, he makes brief mention of investor activism, and my intention here is to develop
this point more fully. See Doorey, "Who Made That?" supra note 25 at 375, 376 [citations
omitted].
70. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 54 at 562 ("[if important and affected groups are left out of
the decision-making process,. it is likely to lose legitimacy. ... This could include ...
supporting groups that represent under-organized interests" [citation omitted]).
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ship to social disclosure. It will then situate this relationship within the theories of
reflexive law and new governance.
II. SOCIAL DISCLOSURE AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
A. THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL MECHANISM
Subject to certain exceptions, the shareholder proposal mechanism provides
shareholders with the right to compel corporate management to hold a share-
holder vote on issues that the proposing shareholder considers important. Share-
holder-initiated proposals occupy a unique place in corporate law because they
provide the shareholder. with a mechanism by which to initiate corporate action,
rather than simply react to the actions of management. They are one of the
few corporate tools available to facilitate shareholder-to-shareholder and share-
holder-to-management dialogue. The proposal mechanism is not intended to
usurp the power of management, "but rather to provide shareholders with the
opportunity to express their views on issues affecting their corporation,"71 and to
allow them "to hold management accountable for its actions and to influence
management's future business decisions by having a public forum in which
to challenge management."72 Procedurally, the corporation is obligated to in-
clude a proposal in the management proxy circular materials,73 and 'shareholders
then consider the proposal before a vote at an annual or special meeting. The
corporation, however, is absolved from the duty to distribute a proposal if cer-
tain procedural requirements are not met, or if there is a substantive basis for
exclusion. 4
In 2001, the Canada Business Corporation Act (CBCA) was substantially
amended. Particularly germane to the present discussion was an amendment
pertaining to when management can lawfully refuse to circulate a shareholder
71. Thomas A. DeCapo, "Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment with the Shareholder
Proxy Proposal Rule" (1988) U. Ill. L. Rev. 119 at 138.
72. Ibid. at 138-39 [citations omitted]. The proposal mechanism is an alternative to simply
raising an issue. from the meeting floor, which "often gets a nonresponsive reply ... [and] [e]ven
if [the shareholder's] question is answered ... his efforts will generate as much noise as a tree
falling in an uninhabited forest." See Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, "An Assessment
of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule" (1977) 65 Geo. L.J. 635 at 641 [citations omitted].
73. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 137(2) [CBCA].
74. Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks," supra note 28 at 385-90.
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proposal on substantive grounds. Previously, the legislation permitted exclusion
if the proposal was submitted "by the shareholder primarily for the purpose of
... promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes."75 Under the revised provision, exclusion is permitted where it "clearly
appears that the proposal does not relate in a significant way to the business or
affairs of the corporation."76
Although there is still substantial cause for skepticism and concern, 77 this
revision is a positive development in influencing corporate behaviour. The fed-
eral government's removal of the previously enumerated proposal restrictions
can be viewed as a tacit acknowledgement that social, political, and similar is-
sues need not be excluded from corporate discourse, so long as a nexus is estab-
lished between these issues and the business or affairs of the corporation. It is
clear from the federal government's own Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement
that the CBCA amendments were, in part, designed to enhance shareholder
voice in the corporate decision-making process. 78
Subsequent to the amendment, there has been a marked increase in the use
of the proposal mechanism in the realm of human rights and social policy. In
2001, the year of the amendments, only two social responsibility-related share-
holder proposals were submitted to Canadian corporations. 79 The number of
proposals stayed the same in 2002.8" However, from 2003 to 2006, the num-
bers increased to thirteen,1 eleven, 2 twenty-five,"5 and twenty-eight."6
75. Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 137(5)(b) [prior to the 2001
amendments].
76. CBCA, supra note 73; s. 137(5)(b.1).
77. Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks," supra note 28 at 368-69, 386, 390, 392-404.
78. Industry Canada, "Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement - Canada Business Corporations Act,"
online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/en/cs01381 e.html>.
79. Richardson, supra note 25 at 183.
80. Social Investment Organization, "Canadian Social and Environmental Resolutions Reach 13
This Year, Up from Two in 2002," online: <http://www.socialinvestment.ca/News&Archives/
news-803-Canadian.htm>. The Social Investment Organization is a non-profit organization
that promotes Canadian socially responsible investment and monitors social policy-related
shareholder proposals submitted to Canadian firms.
81. Ibid.
82. Social Investment Organization, "Socially Responsible Shareholder Proposals Double in
2005; Climate Change, Human Rights Leading Issues," online: <http://
www.sociainvestment.ca/News&Archives/news-305-ShareholderProposals.htm>.
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The shareholder proposal mechanism is an invaluable tool in the corporate
law workshop. Proposals serve to engage shareholders by facilitating communi-
cation. By generating debate and raising the level of discourse within the corpo-
ration, they play an educative role and can cause otherwise passive shareholders
to rethink their sometimes uncritical support of management. It is of paramount
importance that this mechanism compels management to put forth a justifica-
tion of its decision to exclude a proposal. For example, under the CBCA, if the
corporation wishes to exclude a proposal, it must "notify in writing the person
submitting the proposal of its intention to omit the proposal from the manage-
ment proxy circular and of the reasons for the refusal.""5 On this point, approxi-
mately fifty years ago, Milton Freeman remarked:
In judging the value of the stockholder proposal rule, I believe it is of no conse-
quence whether a stockholder ever prevails or whether a management ever accepts a
stockholder's proposal. The value which I see in the rule is that to the extent that
stockholders challenge the judgment of management, management is required to
make a defense of its position.
8 6
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL DISCLOSURE AND
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
The value of a mechanism that serves to stimulate dialogue and heighten dis-
course is severely compromised if it is not accompanied by the necessary infor-
mational infrastructure." Social disclosure is an integral component of share-
holder voice. Without disclosure of material information, the ability to initiate
dialogue and facilitate corporate democracy does not live up to its full potential.
This is an important consideration given that shareholders who might actively
83. Ibid.
84. Social Investment Organization, "Canadian SRI Investors File 28 Social and Environmental
Shareholder Proposals with Canadian Firms," online: <http://www.socialinvestment.ca/
News&Archives/news-0306-Shareholderproposals.htm>.
85. CBCA, supra note 73, s. 137(7).
86. Milton V. Freeman, "An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Pro-
posal Rule" (1957) 34 U. Det. L.J. 549 at 555.
87. A similar point was made by Raymonde Crbte over twenty years ago, when she suggested
that the use of Canadian proposal and proxy mechanisms generally was curtailed, among
other things, by insufficient disclosure. See Raymonde Cr6te, The Proxy System in
Canadian Corporations: CriticalAnalysis (MontrEal: tditions Wilson, Lafleur, Martel, 1986)
at 35 1.
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seek this information generally have finite access to corporate records that would
assist in monitoring the corporate decision-making process.88
As argued in the US context, legal and regulatory barriers that limit share-
holder knowledge of socially relevant business activity-and therefore thwart
the expression of shareholder views on said conduct-have "institutionalized a
form of silence" and led to a "regime of enforced ignorance" that "foster[s] a
false distinction between shareholders as investors and shareholders as citizens."89
Further, even particular commentators who are skeptical of my approach con-
cede the importance of the politics of knowledge dissemination. For example,
constitutional theorist Joel Bakan is dismissive of shareholder voice as a mecha-
nism for facilitating corporate accountability and has argued that "tinkering with
corporate governance" is insufficent." He prefers to look outside of the corpo-
rate form and to focus on the regulation provided by the domestic democratic
state. He acknowledges, however, that his hesitation stems in part from infor-
,mation asymmetries relating to corporate societal impact. 91
With regard to information asymmetries, there is a dearth of information
available to shareholders from corporations. Although some shareholder proposals
may ask management to consider taking concrete steps vis-A-vis social and human
rights-related issues (for example, to produce a human rights impact assessment 92
88. See Christopher C. Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) at
261-62 (canvassing the corporate records that shareholders are allowed to view and noting
how limited shareholder access is, though for understandable reasons). See also Royal
Commission on Corporate Concentration, Corporate Disclosure: A Background Report (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977) at 46 ("[t]he firm responsible for the activity
is in a better position than anyone to know what social costs it may be generating").
89. Faith Stevelman Kahn, "Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power
in Corporate and Securities Law" (1997) 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1107 at 1145.
90. Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Toronto: Penguin,
2004) at 159.
91. Ibid. at 147. Professor Bakan writes:
[E]ven if significant numbers of... shareholders ... were prepared to consider social and en-
vironmental concerns ... a large problem still remains: How do they get the necessary infor-
mation to do this effectively? Corporations have no incentive to reveal their misdeeds to the
public, and the nongovernmental organizations that monitor their activities, though valiant
in their efforts ... nonetheless operate on shoestring budgets and lack the legal authority to
compel corporations to disclose information.
92. See "Produce a human rights impact assessment" in Shareholder Association for Research
and Education (SHARE), "Shareholder Resolution Database," online: <http://www.share.ca/
en/node/1461> [S-ARE, Goldcorp proposal] (proposal to Goldcorp Inc. by the Public
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or to establish a code of conduct for uppliers93), many proposals seek out the
information that would lead to such concrete steps.9" My analysis of data com-
piled by the Shareholder Association for Research and Education reveals that,
in the 2008 proxy season, shareholders submitted approximately eighteen pro-
posals asking Canadian companies to provide the following disclosure and in-
formation production:
" Lending policies pertaining to climate change risk; 9
" Procedures for the appraisal and mitigation of climate risks in project assessment;
" a sustainability report conforming to reporting guidelines of the Global Report-
Service Alliance of Canada Staff Pension Fund et a.). SHARE is a Canadian organization
that focuses on research, education, and advocacy in the field of responsible investment. It
maintains a searchable electronic database of shareholder proposals submitted to Canadian
companies and tracks the outcome of theseproposals.
93. See "Develop code of conduct for suppliers" in ibid., online: <http:/lwww.share.calenlnode/
1327> [SHARE, Winston Proposal] (proposal to Harry Winston Diamond Corp. by Meritas
Mutual Funds).
94. Historically, such attempts were unsuccessful, but not only on account of the previously
enumerated proposal restrictions. In the early 1980s, some Canadian financial institutions
and companies actually included particular social policy proposals, but then "quietly"
recommended that shareholders reject them. This strategy was adopted by CIBC and Alcan,
for example, with respect to proposals seeking disclosure regarding operations and lending
policies in apartheid-era South Africa, and provided successful protection against media
exposure. See Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks," supra note 28 at 391-92,
citing Cr&e, supra note 87 at 191. On a similar-and more recent-note, after two years of
engagement with Goldcorp Inc., one set of investors felt the need to "[step] up engagement
efforts" by actually conducting their own information gathering expedition to a company
mine in Guatemala. See "Investors Spur Goldcorp to Address Human Rights In Guatemala"
(April 2008), online: ,CNW Group <http://www.newswire.ca/fr/releases/archive/April2008/
24/c9323.html?view=print> [CNW Group, "Investors Spur Goldcorp"]. While this action is'
to be commended, it arguably reflects the problematic gaps in company-investor
communication and disclosure.
95. See "Disclose lending procedures regarding climate change risk" in SHARE, supra note 92,
online: <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1318> and <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1319>
(proposals to Bank of Montreal and Bank of Nova Scotia by Ethical Funds Co. These
proposals were withdrawn after successful negotiations with both banks).
96. See "Disclose methods for evaluating and mitigating climate risks in project assessment" in
ibid., online: <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1381> and <http://www.share.ca/en/node/
1385> (proposals to Encana Corporation and Teck Cominco Ltd. by Inhance Investment
Management. Both proposals were subsequently withdrawn. The first was withdrawn after
successful negotiations).
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ing Initiative;
97
" a report pertaining to climate change risk and related disclosure;98
" a report pertaining to investment in Burma, given state violations of human
rights;99
" a social and environmental sustainability report; and
" a report pertaining to the Extractive Industries Tranparency Initiative (in particu-
lar, a progress report on the firm's endorsement of the Initiative and its contribu-
tion to the implementation of the Initiative in places of operation).'0 1
C. CONNECTING THE DISCLOSURE AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH NEW GOVERNANCE AND REFLEXIVE LAW
My contention is that enhanced social disclosure is integral to a vibrant share-
holder proposal culture, and the symbiotic operation of the two has the poten-
tial to be an important tool in the Canadian corporate accountability toolbox.
This argument can be grounded in the reflexive law and new governance con-
ceptions of regulation that are discussed above. David and Louise Trubek have
set out a three-fold framework to describe the interaction between traditional
legal regulation and new governance approaches. When both work simultane-
ously, but independently, towards a common goal, they are "complementary."
When the latter is set up to achieve the same goals as the former, and does so in
a superior manner, the two systems are in a state of "rivalry." And when both not
only co-exist in a particular sphere, but are integral to one another's successful
97. See "Issue a GRI sustainability report" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.calen/node/
1244>, <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1263>, <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1264>, and
<http://www.share.calen/node/1328> (proposals to Air Canada, Transat AT Inc., and
WestJet Airlines Ltd. by Batirente, and a proposal to Shoppers Drug Mart by Meritas
Mutual Funds).
98. See "Report on climate risks and disclosure" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.calenl
node/1320>, <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1322>, <http://www.share.calen/node/1324>,
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1384>, <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1386>, and <http://
www.share.calen/node/1389> (proposals to Canadian Utilities Ltd., Finning International
Inc., and Russell Metals Inc. by Ethical Funds Co., and proposals to Ritchie Bros. Auction-
eers, Finning International Inc., and TSX Group Inc. by Inhance Investment Management).
.99. See "Report on implications of investment in Burma" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.ca/
en/node/1368> (proposal to Power Corporation of Canada by Ethical Funds Co.).
100. See "Sustainability reporting" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.calen/node/1383> and
<http://www.share.calen/node/1388> (proposals to Sun Life Financial Inc. and Research In
Motion Ltd. by Inhance Investment Management).
101. See "Endorse the Extractice Industries Transparency Initiative" in ibid., online: <http://
www.share.ca/en/node/1314> (proposal to Petro-Canada by Batirente).
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performance, there is a state of "transformation," where the synthesis of both
approaches results in a new, hybrid type of regulation and governance." 2
When considering the shareholder proposal mechanism as a potential rights-
based tool, the relationship between social disclosure and proposals might fall
into the third category." 3 The governmental function is one that is traditionally
"top-down": the design and enforcement of social reporting provisions. Although
this may not involve the direct regulation of corporate conduct with societal
implications,0 4 part of the goal of new governance and reflexive law is to pro-
vide information-and therefore empowerment-to various third party players
for use in both the public and private spheres.' The new governance and re-
flexive approach is participatory and democratic, and involves multiple societal
segments.' 6
This approach focuses on the dialogue that will arise between corporate
management and concerned investors, and the potential for negative market
reactions. When investors receive the relevant disclosure regarding corporate
social misconduct (e.g., evidence of high polluting activity. 7) their reaction is
negative-they think that the information reflects inadequate management and
operational inefficiencies, and is either an assault on reputational capital or a
signal that more onerous direct forms of regulation will follow." 8 Shareholders
can then express these concerns to management through a shareholder proposal.
Instead of focusing solely on the decision and its result, management's disclo-
sure provides investors with a more complete picture of the rationales underlying
corporate decisions. This disclosure initiates a dialogue that helps to facilitate a
102. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 54 at 543.
103. The fact that the shareholder proposal provision has existed in corporate law for quite some
time does not preclude it from being thought of as reflecting a new governance approach. As
argued by Trubek & Trubek, "the term 'new' does not necessarily mean that the teihniques
so labeled are all recent in origin. Some of these techniques have existed for some time, often
as informal processes. What is new really is the self-conscious and regularized use of these
approaches as an alternative or supplement to traditional forms." Ibid. at 543, n. 9.
104. Hess, "Public Pensions," supra note 48 at 234.
105. Ibid. at 233-34 [citation omitted].
106. Hess, "New Governance Regulation," supra note 37 at 455.
107. Hess, "Public Pensions," supra note 48 at 233 [citing various US studies regarding public
disclosure of toxic emissions]. Studies suggest a negative market reaction to high pollution
levels reported under US Toxics Release Inventory requirements.
108. Ibid. [citation omitted].
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relationship of trust; 109 investors reply in the form of a proposal. The proposal
should be seen less as an adversarial expression and more as a means of stimu-
lating debate and negotiation, with a view towards addressing issues of mutual
concern.
As stated above, I prefer to think of disclosure as a means of strengthening
the position of human rights-conscious shareholders, rather than as a process
that will result in self-correcting behaviour modification on the part of corpo-
rate decision makers. It is important not to overstate this position, as my claim
faces the same speculative hurdles that are discussed above. However, there is
increasing evidence in Canada "suggest[ing] that today's proposals may become
tomorrow's corporate policy."11 The proposal submission process, and resulting
dialogue between proposing shareholders and management, has fundamentally
influenced the formulation of corporate policy with respect to social and human
rights-related issues. In particular cases, shareholders have withdrawn their pro-
posals after concluding successful negotiations with management.
In 2006, I canvassed several examples of this trend: in particular, shareholder
proposals submitted to Enbridge Inc., McDonald's, IPSCO Inc., Petro-Canada,
the Bank of Montreal, Cott Corporation, and Encana Corp.11 More recent
examples include a 2008 proposal to Goldcorp Inc. by a group of investors led
by the Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff Pension Fund. Goldcorp has
been severely criticized for the human rights and evironmental repercussions of
its global mining practices. " 2 The proposal asked the company to produce an,
independent human rights impact assessment pertaining to its activities in Gua-
temala and was withdrawn after the corporation agreed to do so in the following
eight to twelve months." 3 The importance of this development cannot be over-
109. Hess, "Social Reporting," supra note 32 at 82-83.
110. Janis Sarra, "Shareholders as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada Business Cor-
porations Act" (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 52 at 74-75.
111. Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks," supra note 28 at 405-07.
112. For recent examples, see Rights Action, "Investing in Conflict," supra note 18; CCODP,
"Mining for Justice," supra note 18; and Imai, Mehranvar & Sander, "Breaching Indigenous
Law," supra note 21.
113. SHARE, Goldcorp proposal, supra note 92. For recent accounts of local resistance to Gold-
corp's operations in Guatemala, see Andy Hoffman, "Goldcorp Bested by Mayan Mother"
The Globe andMail (10 July 2008) B1; Dawn Paley, "Goldcorp: Occupation and Resistance
in Guatemala (and Beyond)" The Dominion (21 June 2008), online: <http://www.dominion
paper.ca/weblogs/dawn/ 1887>.
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stated. It is unprecedented for a Canadian company to undertake a social im-
pact assessment in this manner, 14 the aim of which "is to provide the company
with concrete recommendations regarding its implementation of policies and
procedures, and the impact of those policies and procedures on human rights." '
In addition to the end goal (i.e., the impact assessment), the process of con-
sidering and adopting an assessment methodology is of great value. Since with-
drawing their proposal, these shareholders have been working in collaboration
with Goldcorp to design a procedure that will best yield a legitimate and inclu-
sive impact assessment. 1 6 The text of the proposal also makes specific reference
to the assessment methodology generated by Rights & Democracy, a Canadian
civil society group.1 7 This organization's methodology for impact assessments
entails ten steps that include ascertaining the human rights context in the state
that will host the proposed investment; seeking expert views on relevant human
rights challenges; interviewing community members, government officials, cor-
porate representatives, and workers; formulating a draft report to be commented
on by all relevant parties; establishing a set of conclusions and suitable corrective
measures; and monitoring and continuing assessment.118 Undertaking an
evaluation of this methodology (and others like it), and considering how it can be
best integrated into corporate operations, is a process that will be educative for
114. CNW Group, "Investors Spur Goldcorp," supra note 94.
115. SHARE, Goldcorp proposal, supra note 92. This development was regarded negatively by
some civil society groups, pointing to the complexity of the debate surrounding shareholder
action as a means of facilitating corporate accountability. See Rights Action, "Open Letter
from Rights Action to Goldcorp Inc. and Shareholders" (1 May 2008), online: <http://
www.rightsaction.org/articles/Goldcorp-Open%2Letter_- 050 f108.html> ("we believe it will
harm and undermine the clearly stated demands and positions of the Goldcorp-affected in-
digenous communities and may result in a whitewashing public relations exercise that only
benefits Goldcorp and company shareholders and investors").
116. Shareholder Association for Research and Education, "Shareholder Engagement Activity
Report QI/08," online: <http://www.share.ca/files/2OO8-QlEngagementReport_
WEB.pdf> at 6 [SHARE, "Shareholder Engagement Activity"].
117. SHARE, Goldcorp proposal, supra note 92.
118. Rights & Democracy, "Human Rights Impact Assessments for Foreign Investment Projects"
(2007) at 18-19, online: <www.dd-rd.calsite/_PDFlpublications/globalization/hrial
full%20reportmay_2007.pdf>. Rights & Democracy is a non-partisan organization that
works with governments and different interest groups in Canada and abroad in the realm of
human and democratic rights. One of its specific areas of focus is corporate responsibility
and the effects of investment and trade on human rights.
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management and will assist it in developing a fluency in human rights concepts
and processes.
Finally, other recent examples of shareholder "proposals becoming policy"
include a 2008 proposal by Meritas Mutual Funds asking Harry Winston Dia-
mond Corp. to establish, inter alia, a code of conduct for suppliers and a mecha-
nism to evaluate supplier connections with oppressive governments (the proposal
was withdrawn after successful negotiations); 19 a 2007 proposal by Ethical Funds
Co. asking Nortel Networks Corp. to report on the design and implementation
of human rights related policies vis-h-vis operations in countries such as China
and Iraq (withdrawn after successful negotiations);12 a 2006 proposal by Les
Soeurs de Sainte-Anne asking Barrick Gold Corp. to report regarding the on-
the-ground repercussions resulting from its controversial Pascua-Lama project
in Chile (withdrawn after successful negotiations);' and a 2006 proposal by
Ethical Funds Co. asking Enbridge Inc. to report, inter alia, on how exisiting
and future operations could be impacted by indigenous land claims, and on plans
for consultation with and compensation to affected indigenous communities
(withdrawn after successful negotiations).122
Although stakeholder participation and engagement are crucial (and, indeed,
fundamental to my argument), some of the new governance literature that seems
to celebrate the notion of the decentred state goes too far in shifting the state's
burden onto others.123 For example, although the federal government's National
Roundtables were a true multi-stakeholder consultation, Sara Seck cautions that,
when the state puts itself on the same level as other interested groups, there is
the risk that it will abdicate its governmental responsibilities:
119. SHARE, Winston proposal, supra note 93; SHARE, "Shareholder Engagement Activity,"
supra note 116 at 6.
120. See "Report on human rights policy and implementation" in SHARE, supra note 92, online:
<http:l/www.share.ca/en/node/982>.
121. See "Report on local effects of Pascua-Lama Project" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.ca/
en/node/584>.
122. See "Report on effects on 1st Nation's lands" in ibid., online: <http://www.share.ca/en/
node/587>.
123. Adam Crawford, "Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?" (2006) 10
Theoretical Criminology 449 at 458 ("I believe it would be foolish to 'throw out the state'
with the.governance or governmentality bath water. ... [W]e should not get carried away
with 'a giddy sense at the moment among many intellectuals that the state is passe'"
[citations omitted]).
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In essence, the government committed to participating in a process in which its role
was equal to that of other stakeholders, rather than acknowledging that as a state, the
government of Canada possesses the authority-and has a responsibility-to govern
in the public interest.
Thus, Canada is a partner in a process, instead of taking on a mandating, facilitating
or endorsing role. ... While there is nothing wrong with the state taking on a part-
nership role, it is problematic when the state refuses to concede that it might also
have a part to play in a mandating role.
12
4
This concern over a decentered state is especially consequential where there
is an imbalance of power amongst stakeholders. There is the danger, for example,
that global corporations will use their dominance to usurp processes and unduly
influence corporate accountability discourse.
125
The state's leadership role in requiring and enhancing social disclosure is
not antithetical to a new governance approach. 126 As Karkkainen has ob-
served, a widespread misapprehension about new governance is that it is com-
pletely dependent on soft law tools and that it represents a sort of "wishful
thinking" because its success is contingent on "good intentions and voluntary
actions." ' 27 He further opines that this misapprehension may, in part, be unwit-
tingly perpetuated by new governance writing itself.
The April 2008 report of John Ruggie, Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations,
establishes an excellent balance between the role of the state and the importance
of new governance and reflexive approaches that eschews traditional command-
style regulation. The report resulted from several multi-stakeholder consultations
124. See Seck, supra note 21 at 184, n. 35 [citations omitted].
125. Conley & Williams, "Engage, Embed, and Embellish," supra note 38 at 36 [citation omitted].
126. Securities law in Canada falls under provincial jurisdiction (although particular federal
provisions impact securities trading). As such, any direct action to enhance social disclosure
would likely come from the provinces. In this context, my use of the term "state" should be
read expansively, in harmony with the definition recently put forth by Professor Gordley:
"I hope the word 'state' is not misleading. Public authority has taken many forms, and
,states' in the modern sense are a new phenomenon. By state, I will mean any public
authority that administers justice on the basis of texts it recognizes or promulgates." See
James Gordley, "The State's Private Law and Legal Academia" (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. L.
639 at 639-40.
127. Karkkainen, supra note 38 at 488-89.
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with Dr. Ruggie. I participated in the November 2007 consultation, in Copen-
hagen. As highlighted in the consultation summary:
Several participants noted the importance of considering corporate law when explor-
ing the tools available to States in improving corporate behaviour. Corporations re-
ceive [legal] personality through government approval, and these participants said
more thought should be given to how that privilege could be made conditional on
respect for human rights.
1 2s
The report advances a useful framework going forward; it presents the state
as the primary duty-bearer, but clarifies that states, to date, have been adopting
too narrow an approach in operationalizing their duty.'29 Under the state's
"duty to protect" against human rights abuses by third parties (including corpora-
tions), it suggests that governments turn their attention to developing corporate
cultures that foster rights-adherence through, for example, the development of
sustainability reporting. 30
128. See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises -Addendum: Summary
of Five Multi-Stakeholder Consultations, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add. 1 (23 April 2008) at
para. 18, online: <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-l-addendum-23-April-
2008.pdf>.
129. See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (7 April
2008) at para. 22, online: <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-
2008.pdf> ("many governments take a narrow approach to managing the business and
human rights agenda. It is often segregated within its own conceptual and (typically weak)
institutional box kept apart from, or heavily discounted in, other policy domains that
shape business practices, including ... securities regulation and corporate governance"
[citations omitted]).
130. Ibid. at paras..29-30. Taking this a step further, if it can be argued that the international law
of state responsibility mandates the application of home-state jurisdiction over transnational
corporate conduct with rights violating implications, can it also be said that a state's laws
governing corporations should be analyzed through an international law lens? See Sara L. Seck,
"Framework Principles: Home State Responsibility" (Doctoral thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 2008) at 227 [citation omitted] [unpublished]. Seck explains that:
The argument here is that legislation granting legal personality to a corporation must surely
be in breach of an obligation to regulate that corporation, if the grant of personality is made
without ensuring that the requisite characteristics for effective regulation are part of incorpora-
tion status. A further argument could be that the obligation to regulate the conduct of Cana-
dian mining companies in the realm of human rights and environmental norms cannot be
met by corporate law statutes that embody a shareholder model of corporate governance con-
sequently precluding effective procedures for bringing the rights of local communities to the
attention of management.
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL DISCLOSURE
AND DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
In addition to the arguments advanced above, a movement towards enhanced
social disclosure should be viewed as the corollary of recent developments in
Canadian corporate law involving directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations.
Canadian corporate directors and officers are subject to a fiduciary duty that
requires them to "act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests
of the corporation."131 The precise normative content of the nebulous phrase
"best interests of the corporation" has been the subject of vibrant debate in the
literature and jurisprudence, and engages one of the most critical aspects of
corporate law theory: to whom exactly is this duty owed? In discharging this
duty to "the corporation," should the interests of shareholders be considered ex-
clusively, with a view towards maximizing shareholder wealth (i.e., the share-
holder primacy model)? Or is it appropriate to consider the positions of non-
shareholder stakeholders, such as a company's creditors, employees, consumers,
suppliers, and the broader community (i.e., the pluralist or communitarian
model)?132
Although the shareholder primacy model has traditiohally functioned as
the dominant paradigm in modern American corporate law, its paramountcy in
Canada was thrown into question by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples
Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of v. Wise.133 Scholars have said that the Court
in Peoples rejected the shareholder primacy model 3 ' when it held that the board
of directors, in fulfilling its duty to act in the "best interests of the corporation,"
was permitted to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. The
Court stated:
[I]t is clear that the phrase the "best interests of the corporation" should be read not
simply as the "best interests of the shareholders." ... [Iun determining whether they
are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate,
131. CBCA, supra note 73, s. 122(1)(a). Parallel provisions exist in provincial corporate law
statutes. See e.g., Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 134(1)(a).
132. I have canvassed particular aspects oFthis debate elsewhere and will not revisit them here. See
Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks," supra note 28 at 369-74; Dhir, "Of
Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human Rights," supra note 28 at 92-94.
133. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 [Peoples].
134. Ian Lee, "Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the 'Best Interests of the Corporation'"
(2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 212 [Lee, "Peoples"].
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given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, in-
ter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers,
governments and the environment.
135
The corollary of permitting directors to consider non-shareholder interests in
fulfilling their duties to the corporation is that their doing so will not result in a
violation of their fiduciary duty.
The Peoples decision leaves various issues unresolved respecting the scope of
directors' duties. 136 For example, it has been argued that the decision fails to
appreciate the distinctions between concepts of oppression, duty of loyalty, and
duty of care; 137 mischaracterizes the jurisprudence on which it relies; 138 and in-
correctly suggests that director mala fides is an integral component of a breach
of fiduciary duty.'39 Further, to the extent that Peoples assaults the "ideological
hegemony""'0 of the standard shareholder primacy model, it does little in the
way of offering a prescription for future board conduct. Most notably, Peoples
does not resolve what it means for a board to consider the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders. What should such a consideration entail-how far
must directors go in juggling competing interests, and how should conflicts be
resolved?"" How much consideration will be sufficient to satisfy the fiduciary
duty? Do directors themselves have the necessary tools and knowledge base to
135. Peoples, supra note 133 at para. 42.
136. Janis Sarra, "Class Act: Considering Race and Gender in the Corporate Boardroom" (2005)
79 St. John's L. Rev. 1121 at 1139 [Sarra, "Class Act"].
137. Mohamed F. Khimji, "Peoples v. Wise - Conflating Directors' Duties, Oppression, and
Stakeholder Protection" (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 209.
138. Lee, "Peoples," supra note 134 at 217.
139. Darcy L. MacPherson, "The Supreme Court Restates Directors' Fiduciary Duty - A
Comment on Peoples Department Stores v. Wise" (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 383. For further
critiques, see Warren Grover, "The Tangled Web of the Wise Case" (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J.
200; Jacob S. Ziegel, "The Peoples Judgment and the Supreme Court's Role in Private Law
Cases" (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 236; and Robert Flannigan, "Reshaping the Duties of
Directors" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 365.
140. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2001) 89
Geo. L.J. 439 at 468.
141. Also, what are the accountability implications? "[A) manager told to serve two masters (a
little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is
answerable to neither." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 38.
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actually engage in a meaningful assessment of non-shareholder interests? If they
do not, how can this be remedied?
Peoples represents a shift in the way fiduciary obligations are conceptualized
under Canadian corporate law, given prior jurisprudence that interpreted the
"best interests of the corporation" as being synonymous with maximizing
shareholder return. 14 2 However, the Supreme Court's departure from traditional
doctrine may not be so radical. For example, although shareholder primacy is
considered to be the controlling model, Lee recently argued that its dominance
as an actual matter of law is exaggerated both by its proponents and detractors
and that "[t]he legal situation is, in fact, persistently ambiguous."" 3
Further, althbugh there are inadequacies and troublesome ambiguities in the
Supreme Court's legal reasoning in rejecting shareholder primacy, analytical defi-
ciencies should -not be equated with normative deficiencies. The pluralist con-
ception of directors' fiduciary obligations is under-theorized in Canada and
carries many difficulties; however, it does not necessarily follow that such a con-
ception is ill-advised. There is robust literature supporting the pluralist model or
variants thereof,144 and, in jurisdictions comparable to Canada, there is a move-
ment away from exclusively maximizing shareholder wealth in the short term
and towards recognizing the long-term interests of other stakeholders as well.'
142. Sarra, "Class Act," supra note 136 at 1139, n. 77, citing various Ontario and Saskatchewan
decisions.
143. Lee, "Corporate Law," supra note 25 at 33. See also Ian B. Lee, "Is there a Cure for
Corporate 'Psychopathy'?" (2005) 42 Am. Bus. L.J. 65 at 72-73; Ian B. Lee, "Corporate Law
and the Role of Corporations in Society: Monism, Pluralism, Markets and Politics" (2006)
85 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 24.
144. For a limited sample, see the articles surveyed in Dhir, "Realigning the Corporate Building
Blocks," supra note 28 at 371, n. 22. It is bey9nd the scope of this paper to canvass the
arguments in favour of a pluralist approach.
145. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, "An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct" (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 493 at 496, 502.
While American corporate governance remains firmly focused on shareholder value, the
United Kingdom ... appears to be setting out on a "third way" that merges elements of the
shareholder and stakeholder approaches.... In the realm of corporate social responsibility ...
Britain has very recently emerged as a leader. Its "third way" explicitly advocates a shift in fo-
cus to long-term, "enlightened shareholder value" and requires that companies recognize and
report on their effects on extended stakeholder constituencies, such as employees, suppliers,
communities, and the environment.
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Whether or not one supports a'pluralist conception of the corporation,
post-Peoples, Canadian directors are now legally permitted to consider non-
shareholder interests." 6 Given this development, it will now be necessary for
shareholders to evaluate directors' actions with respect to a range of constituen-
cies. Enhanced social disclosure obligations are a logical progression. Recent
social disclosure provisions in the UK are specifically linked to new, expanded
fiduciary duty provisions. Under the Companies Act 2006, directors have a duty
to advance the firm's success for the benefit of its members. In doing so, they
are to have regard to various constituencies, including customers, suppliers,
employees, the community, and the environment."' 7 In light of this extended
fiduciary duty, the business review that must form part of the director's report
and its accompanying social disclosure elements are intended, in part, to assist
shareholders in evaluating how directors are faring in fulfilling their fiduciary
obligations." 8
[Tlhe relatively stronger pro-stakeholder influences in the UK are already leading to a subtle
shift in the conceptualization of the corporate purpose from maximizing shareholder wealth
in the short term, as in the United States, to the creation of a broader-based and longer-term
"enlightened shareholder value."
146. This reality was further solidified by the Supreme Court in December 2008 in BCE Inc. v.
1976Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 at paras. 39-40 ("[i]n Peoples Department Stores,
this Court found that although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation,
it may also be appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate
decisions on ... particular groups of stakeholders. ... In considering what is in the best
interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders,
employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions" [emphasis in original]).
147. Companies Act 2006 (U.K.), 2006, c. 46, s. 172(1).
148. Ibid., s. 417(2). Cross-national studies have explored the linkage between culturally acquired
views regarding business' proper societal function and cross-country disparities in social
disclosure, concluding that there is strong evidence supporting the proposition that investors
in countries with a pluralistic corporate culture rely on social disclosure more in making
investment determinations than those in countries with cultures rooted in shareholder
primacy. See Joyce Van Der Laan Smith, Rasoul H. Tondkar & Robert L. Andrews, "The
Impact of Corporate Social Disclosure on Investment Behavior - A Cross-National Study"
(Paper presented to the International Federation of Scholarly Associations of Management
VIlth World Congress 2006, 30 September 2006), online: IFSAM VlIth World Congress
2006 <http://www.ctw-congress.de/ifsam/download/track1/papO05 4 2 -001.pdf>. See also
Joyce van der Laan Smith, Ajay Adhikari & Rasoul H. Tondkar, "Exploring Differences in
Social Disclosures Internationally: A Stakeholder Perspective" (2005) 24 J. Accounting &
Pub. Pol'y 123.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Canadian securities law provides a legal basis to compel the reporting of material
social information through existing continuous disclosure obligations that gov-
ern public companies and require them to provide periodic and timely disclo-
sure to investors. With the disclosure of'this information, shareholders are in a
better position to assess pecuniary risks and to allocate capital to firms that are
best suited to mitigate these risks. But moving beyond the sphere of investor
protection, social disclosure also has implications for the overall human rights
project. The analysis of these implications is grounded in the broader theoretical
frameworks of new governance and reflexive law. I distance myself slightly from
the argument in the literature to date that the disclosure process will result in
behaviour modification on the part of corporate decision makers. Rather, the
value of social disclosure may lie more in its ability to empower socially con-
scious shareholders who will be equipped with information that can be used to
engage corporate management in dialogue and influence corporate operations.
A movement towards enhanced social disclosure should also be viewed as the
corollary of recent developments in Canadian corporate law involving directors'
and officers' fiduciary obligations.
The approach advocated here is not meant to detract from calls for direct
state regulation. For example, civil society, non-industry members of the National
Roundtables Advisory Group encouraged the adoption of federal legislation that
would regulate the overseas business activities of the Canadian extractive sector
and would be connected with a civil liability regime. 14 9 Direct regulation, how-
ever, presents significant hurdles. At the level of political feasibility, this issue
could not be agreed upon within the Advisory Group itself,"' and there have been
few encouraging signs of direct regulation from the current federal government.
In addition, some scholars have argued that substantive law "is incapable of
producing socially responsible behavior from corporations" because (1) it pro-
149. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, supra note 5 at 42. This idea recently received
attention from Supreme Court of Canada Justice Ian Binnie. See Cristin Schmitz, "Binnie
Calls for Corporate Accountability" The Lauyers Weekly (29 August 2008), online:
<http://www.lawyersweekly.calindex.phpsection=article&articleid=745> ("[l]awmakers
should consider enacting new legislation that would enable Canadian companies to be sued
domestically in superior court for alleged complicity in human rights violations abroad, says
Supreme Court of Canada Justice Ian Binnie").
150. National Roundtables, Advisory Group Report, ibid.
82 (2009) 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
duces a plethora of elaborate requirements that cannot be reasonably complied
with; (2) it is too reactive in nature; (3) it may lack normative legitimacy and
involve excessive enforcement costs; and (4) it incorrectly steers companies to-
wards meeting threshold behavioural standards rather than creating innovative
solutions."5 '
4 In light of these political and substantive challenges that must be addressed,
the enhancement of Canadian social disclosure requirements-and, in particular,
the resulting informational infrastructure--offers a complementary approach
that will hopefully assist in addressing the deleterious impacts of transnational
corporate conduct.
151. See Hess, "Social Reporting," supra note 32 at 58-59.
